Characterizes safe rights transitions in dynamic assignment markets and shows how exchange titles insure licensed investments through a title-insurance hypergraph.
Yield restrictions can trigger funding flight toward redemption and weaken stablecoin issuer recovery, while settlement netting can restore the intended policy effect.
Introduces a college-admissions mechanism with flexible seat allocation that is stable, strategy-proof, and welfare-improving relative to standard deferred acceptance.
Income shocks increase religious giving because donors use charity as a form of spiritual insurance; the paper combines bank transaction data with a large field experiment.
Common AI model adoption can expose banks to unpriced correlated errors, producing too little model diversity and greater systemic risk.
Reliable assignment aftermarkets insure main-round failure but induce strategic reaching, and priority cannot preserve discipline once rescue demand exhausts available seats.
Characterizes how stationary screening jointly determines current allocations and future type distributions, and prices the output cost of cohort-composition targets through a …
With imperfectly observed ability, Immediate Acceptance can outperform Deferred Acceptance and, under a transparent indifference condition, can even implement the …
Studies how IPO regulation can unintentionally facilitate collusion by enabling self-organized investor cartels in primary markets.
Examines how opinion leaders transmit both information and emotion in online investor communities, shaping attention and trading behavior.